Knowing Life as an Indivisible Whole

 

J.S. Haldane

From In Context #56 (Fall 2026) | View Article as PDF

In the first decades of the 20th century there were a number of scientists and thinkers who spoke forcefully for a holistic and life-focused understanding of biological phenomena. They did so as thoughtful practicing scientists who were often widely respected for their work. They believed that the increasingly dominant mechanistic interpretation of life did not do justice to reality, despite its power to direct research that produced results. In the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, the mechanistic paradigm became ever more entrenched in biology — it became “the” way to understand life and alternative perspectives were marginalized. 

At The Nature Institute, we have long been interested in these mostly forgotten individuals. We’ve learned much from their publications, discussed them in our articles, and published some excerpts in In Context. (Search on our website for Kurt Goldstein, E. S. Russell, and Paul Weiss.) Here we offer excerpts from J. S. Haldane’s The Philosophical Basis of Biology, taken from pp. 13-30 and 74.

In all his work, Haldane continually sought greater insight into the nature of life. In the excerpts we share here the focus is on the intertwined reality and ultimately inseparable unity of organismic life processes and the environment. He develops an extended view of life that encompasses this unity. This is a radical and, we believe, important perspective. It invites us to wrestle with both mechanistic habits of thought and the notion that life extends only to the assumed boundaries of organisms.

The Phenomenon of Life as Such

Let us consider the relation between a living organism and its environment. The environment may be said to be constantly acting on the organism, and the organism on its environment. The environment is conveying to it food materials, oxygen, and all sorts of stimuli, while the organism is reacting in various ways. We might say the same of any machine or other system working at the expense of material and energy supplied to it by its environment; and we might attribute the peculiarities in the response to peculiarities in the structure of the machine, system, or organism. 

We find, however, that the apparent action and reaction between organism and environment has a distinguishing character which prevents us from regarding it as simply action and reaction. The apparent actions and reactions are, when regarded as a whole, seen to be normally so coordinated that what appears as structure in the organism is actively maintained. Thus structure and activity cannot be separated. The actions cannot be separated from what seem to be innumerable other simultaneous actions and reactions, so coordinated as to express the maintenance of the structure. Hence in interpreting the phenomena we cannot apply the physical conceptions of action and corresponding reaction, or reciprocal action, between self-existing units of matter and energy. We must regard the phenomena as being, in so far as we understand them at all, the active manifestation of a persistent whole; and the whole is what we call the life of the organism, or of the stock to which it belongs. Apart from the conception of life we are lost in endless details — indefinite because they cannot be separately defined. General Smuts has coined the word “holism” for the general principle involved in the conception of life. 

When we consider the structure of an organism and of its environment in so far as the environment is concerned in its life, we find that the structural elements in organism and environment are co-ordinated with one another in a specific manner. The organism is adapted to its environment, or the environment, including the internal environment, to the organism, in such a manner that life is maintained. The environment is thus expressed in the structure of each part of the organism, and conversely. When, moreover, we examine what appears to us as organic structure and the structure of organic environment closely, we find that it is the expression of continuous activity, so coordinated that the structure is maintained. Thus we cannot separate organic from environmental structure, any more than we can separate the action of the environment from the reaction of the organism. 

Moreover, the spatial relations of the parts do not imply their separate existence from one  another, since we cannot define them as existing separately when their very existence expresses coordination with one another. The co-ordination extends over surrounding environment, and the spatial relations of parts and environment express unity, not separation. They also cannot be described as existing within space; for the co-ordination embodied in them is not limited to a certain position in space, but extends indefinitely beyond any spatial position which we might attempt to assign to it. 

Physiologists are constantly discovering what, following the present custom, they denominate as physical or chemical mechanisms within the living body. But these so-called mechanisms are at the same time actively maintained at the right places and in the right functional states. Their discovery is thus no more a step towards a physico-chemical conception of life than a step away from it, but simply a step in the direction of knowledge as to how life as such manifests itself. 

When we see that not only are physico-chemical conceptions incapable of representing the phenomena of life, but that the conception of life embraces the environment of an organism, as well as what is within its body, the objections to using it as the basis of biology disappear. The conception of life corresponds simply to what we perceive when we observe the phenomena of life as such. We perceive the relations of the parts and environment of an organism as being of such a nature that a normal and specific structure and environment is actively maintained. This active maintenance is what we call life, and the perception of it is the perception of life. The existence of life as such is thus the axiom on which scientific biology depends.

Evolution, Mechanism, and Holism 

It is often supposed, or assumed off-hand, that the Darwinian theory of differentiation of species by natural selection amounts to a physico-chemical theory of the differentiation of structure in living organisms, and a step towards a mechanistic conception of life. It seems to me that this is by no means the case. The theory assumes in the first place the natural occurrence of variation, and in the second place the fact of hereditary transmission. 

Now any variation which was not heritable would count for nothing in the theory; and the fact of hereditary transmission implies the distinctively biological conception that the life of an organism is a unity which is constantly maintaining and reproducing itself. Quite evidently this conception does not exclude variation, provided that in the variation the unity of life is maintained. In the adaptation of an organism to new circumstances, such as life at a high altitude or in a warmer or colder climate, there is not only adaptation of activities, but also of structure, to the new circumstances.

The part played by heredity in the theory of natural selection implies the distinctive conception of life as fundamental in biology. So does the occurrence of heritable variation, which is also an essential feature in the natural selection theory. Both the ordinary structure in any species of organism, and what we regard as variation in it, are active manifestations of life as a unity. They are actively there, and we cannot distinguish between the structure and the activity of which it is the manifestation. Thus the theory of natural selection does not constitute the smallest step in the direction of a mechanistic conception of life. 

When, moreover, we examine carefully into what we might superficially interpret as the mere physical and chemical structures of the different individuals in a species — for instance man — we find distinct differences which are actively maintained in the individual, and are presumably heritable. To take one instance, the constitution of proteins, including hemoglobin, which can be separated from the bodies of different individual men, varies appreciably between different individuals; and this is no mere accidental circumstance, but is as characteristic for the individual as the shape or size of his hands or face, or the colour of his hair. Life is constantly striking out in new directions, as well as propagating itself. The normal of biology is an individual normal and not a statistical normal. Accurate investigation in human physiology has forced this fact upon me again and again. In different individuals of the same species the normal activities of life are appreciably different, and what is normal to one individual may not be so to another. 

It is only if we make an impossible separation between living organisms and a physico-chemical environment surrounding them that it appears to us as if living organisms or their germs, with fixed hereditary tendencies, were in contact with a physical environment. As soon as we realise that the unity of life extends over the environment the appearance of a mechanical action of environment on life ceases. Structure and functional relation to environment cannot be separated in the serious scientific study of life, since structure expresses the maintenance of function, and function expresses the maintenance of structure. 

Cells, Organisms, and Environments in Living Co-Ordination

I have up till now considered biology as if it dealt only with separate individual lives. In many cases, however, it is evident at once that individual lives cannot be separated from one another. Thus if we attempt to regard as mere individual lives the lives of the cells which make up the bodies of any higher animal or plant, we find that we cannot do so. The behaviour of an individual cell is unintelligible apart from its being also an expression of the life of the higher organism as a whole. The individual cells as such express in their genesis, behaviour, and deaths, the life of the whole organism. Both the origin and the fate of these cells express the maintenance of this wider life. Their lives are thus no mere individual lives. We may say the same of the apparent units of life which are distinguishable in the nuclear body of a dividing cell, and of which each plays a specific part in heredity. 

In the lives of the individuals which form a species or stock we see what is similar. The individual life appears, and at death disappears, but the disappearance, as well as appearance, make for the maintenance, since the individuals of the stock must constantly be varying their mode of life in accordance with changing relations to other individuals of both their own and other stocks. New stocks or species may themselves appear and disappear and in their disappearance make for the appearance of new stocks or leave descendants so changed as to constitute new species. 

When, moreover, we consider the various species of living organisms we find that they are dependent on one another. Plants are dependent on lower organisms and animals, while animals are dependent on plants or on other animals. Hence, just as the life of any individual organism exists only as including within itself what are often called its physical environment, so does its life, when more widely interpreted, include within itself the lives of other organisms, so that these lives are not outside its own life, though for practical purposes we usually regard separately what we can most readily treat as individual lives.  

The life of an organism is ultimately just as much bound up with its external as with its internal environment. Without, for instance, a continuous supply of oxygen and food-material life could not continue. But, just as with the internal environment, we can no more regard the activity of the organism as a determining cause of the external environment than the external environment as a determining cause of the organism’s activity. Organism and external environment hang together in the specific manner which is a normal expression of the life of the organism. Life is Nature expressing herself as a characteristic whole which has no spatial bounds. There is no spatial limit to the life of an organism just as there is no spatial limit to what can be perceived. If, however, like the vitalists and many philosophical writers, we start from the conception of a living organism apart from its environment, or, like the mechanists, from the conception of living matter as part of a physically interpreted universe of self-existent units and events, we are unable to frame any coherent conception of life, or of biology as a science.

Important Works by J.S. Haldane.

Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917.

Methods of Air Analysis. London: Charles Griffin and Company, 1918.

The New Physiology. London: Charles Griffin and Company, 1919.

Mechanism, Life, and Personality: An Examination of the Mechanistic Theory of Life and Mind. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1923.

The Sciences and Philosophy. Gifford Lectures, University of Glasgow. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1928. 

Gases and Liquids: A Contribution to Molecular Physics. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1928.

The Philosophical Basis of Biology, Donnellan Lectures, University of Dublin, 1930. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1931.

The Philosophy of a Biologist. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935.

An Inspirational Biography

John Scott Haldane (1860-1936) was a Scottish physiologist, experimenter, inventor, and philosopher whose life work centered around the phenomenon of respiration. As a productive and ingenious research scientist, he investigated the internal physiology and chemistry of respiration, gaining insight into the homeodynamic regulation of gases in the blood, the role of hemoglobin in that regulation, and the effects of acclimatization to different altitudes and diverse barometric pressures. Many of his experiments, often quite dangerous, he performed on himself. He also investigated the gaseous composition of atmospheric air, both in the open and in various kinds of confined spaces. Much of this research is laid out in his 1917 book Organism and Environment as Illustrated by the Physiology of Breathing, and also Methods of Air Analysis (1918).

His work as an experimental scientist was always interwoven with, and often arose out of, social concerns for the welfare of his fellow human beings. He spent much of his time investigating mining conditions and the air composition of mines, especially after gas leaks, explosions, or fires. Haldane popularized the method of the “canary in the coal mine,” where a small animal with rapid respiration and metabolism — such as a mouse or a canary — is kept so that its sickness or death can warn miners of impending danger, especially carbon monoxide poisoning. Not only was he a Fellow of the Royal Society for his scientific achievements, but also a member of the Royal Commission of Mines and even for a time the president of the English Institution of Mining Engineers. His skill at invention was directed not only towards creating new measuring instruments for scientific research, but also towards creating new breathing apparatuses for miners and for soldiers being attacked with poison gas, a better and portable carbon monoxide detector for use in mines, and better decompression chambers for deep sea divers to alleviate “the bends.”

Haldane also realized that a true understanding of life requires not just more observations and better experiments, but the cultivation of new, and more living, thinking. He saw his philosophical works — for example, (1931) The Philosophical Basis of Biology and (1935) The Philosophy of a Biologist — as of equal importance to his scientific inquiries and technological innovations. Here, too, respiration remained his exemplary phenomenon. He articulates this masterfully in The Philosophical Basis of Biology: “In the physiology of breathing . . . we have a clear example of the manner in which environment, maintenance of bodily structure, and mutual influence of bodily activities are so co-ordinated that life is maintained. We cannot study breathing successfully apart from other physiological activities, from the maintenance of bodily structure, and the nature of bodily environment, and when we do study it, bearing in mind what the study involves, the conception of co-ordinated maintenance, or life, becomes the axiom which guides us in the work of observation and experiment” (p. 75). By entering deeply into the phenomenon of breathing, striving to see it in its full reality, Haldane was led to a radical holistic reconceptualization of the science of biology as a whole. And his life reflected what he studied, by uniting his perceiving with his thinking, and both of these into union with caring activity to leave the world a better, and more vital, place than he found it

 
Ryan Shea